The present study will attempt to ascertain if the influence of the Religious Right on American society can be evidenced in the American judicial system, specifically in the votes of evangelical justices sitting on state supreme courts, in the areas of obscenity, the death penalty, and gender discrimination. We hypothesize that the conservative leanings of the Religious Right will be reflected in these votes, suggesting that evangelical religious values have an impact on American politics beyond the electoral ballot box.
A Conceptual Definition of Evangelicals
A major dilemma when studying the political behavior of evangelicals comes from the ambiguousness of the term itself. Three approaches have frequently been used to identify evangelicals: doctrine, self-identification, and denominational affiliation (Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege 1993) . Classifying evangelicals by religious doctrine yields a religiously heterogeneous group with regard to denominational affiliation but can be difficult to operationalize. Self-identification consists of including as evangelicals those people that identify themselves as such. The obvious problem here is that there is no required consistency as to the reasons why some identify themselves as evangelical, and thus the term becomes completely subjective.
For this study, we adopt the third approach: defining evangelicals by membership in a religious denomination. While denominational identification does not always get at the intricacies of belief that may create marked differences in people's religious and political attitudes, it has the virtue of producing a highly reliable measure.
Moreover, Kellstedt and Green (1993) state that a "denomination is a set of religious institutions that are formally linked to one another, and which share common beliefs, practices and commitments" (54). They suggest that the roles religious organizations play in creating similar views among their members and, even more basically, the influences they have in early socialization result in denominational preference being a reflection of a "personal attachment to a particular version of such a tradition" (54).
Thus, we expect that denominational affiliation will be a valid indicator of political beliefs. Admittedly we are unable to explore concepts such as religious salience and participation that have been shown to be factors in the impact religion has on politics. However, these aspects of religious beliefs occur within the context of a particular denomination, indicating that they are shaped by that initial environment (Kellstedt and Green 1993 ).
The argument is that just as party identification reflects certain beliefs of members independent of ideological intensity and activity, denominational preference "may encapsulate differences in belief practice and commitment, even for individuals with nominal religiosity" (55). Because denominational affiliation cuts across the lines of party identification, we hypothesize that religion reflects a source of attitudes that is, at least in part, independent from the partisan sources of attitudes that have been more thoroughly examined in studies of judicial behavior.
We will be adopting Kellstedt and Green's classification of religious denomination for application in this study. The authors have constructed this scheme using a classification system based on distinctions between denominational families and religious movements, ultimately grouping denominations according to "comparable beliefs and ethos" (58).3 Kellstedt and Green (1993) recognize that these categories are often hard to measure and thus defining denominations based on them is imprecise. They attempt to overcome these difficulties by using the family and movement categories together to define religious traditions. (Swierenga 1990 , 151-52; cf. Sommerfield 1968) with regard to levels of institution and centralization within the denominational family. Ritualistic families stress "centralized religious authority, formalized rituals, and official creeds" (57). Denominations are pluralistic within the family. "Pietist families place greater emphasis on the unmediated contact between believers and God and are thus characterized by decentralized religious authority, informal worship, individual religious experience, and emphasis on righteous behavior" (57). These denominations are particularistic within the denominational family.
Religious movements (attempts at change within denominations) are classified as church or sect movements (Stark and Bainbridge 1985) . Church movements seek accommodation and the reduction of differences with a broad culture. They tend to produce liberal denominations with an emphasis on acceptance. Sect movements seek "separation from the broader culture," producing conservative denominations with a conversionist ethos (Kellstedt and Green 1993, 57-58).
Research Design
The data for the analyses below consist of the universe of the obscenity and gender discrimination policy decisions with published opinions and a random sample of 30 death penalty decisions per year for the years 1970 through 1993.4 Westlaw searches were designed to identify all the published cases in each issue area. Decisions that decided purely factual disputes (e.g., whether the defendant was actually the owner of the obscene materials found in the search of her house) without interpreting the meaning of any precedent or addressing any policy question were excluded from analysis. After cases with missing data were excluded, the number of judges' votes suitable for analysis was 3,909 from death penalty cases, 437 votes from gender discrimination cases, and 2,023 from obscenity cases. Data on the background characteristics of the judges whose votes are analyzed were obtained from standard biographic sources including The American Bench and Who s Who in American Law.
The unit of analysis for the models described below is the vote of each judge on each case. For each issue area, an integrated model was created to assess the effects of judicial attitudes, changing policy from the United States Supreme Court, contextual political influence, and case facts specific to the particular issue area.
A dilemma facing those seeking to increase our understanding of appellate court decision making is that integrated models will be incompletely specified unless they include the particular case facts that are most relevant for the type of cases examined. These case facts differ among different types of issues. Consequently, it is impossible to develop comparable models for different case types unless the models are underspecified. Given this dilemma, the present study creates separate models for each of the three issue areas examined, with a core of common variables plus the addition of separate case facts for each issue area.5 Common measures of judicial attitudes, Supreme Court change, and contextual influence were coded for all cases in each of the three issue areas. In addition, since the main theoretical interest of the present analysis is the effect of the religious affiliations of judges, the same measures of judge religion were used for the three issue areas.
Case facts used in each model were derived from previously successful integrated models of appellate decision making in each issue area. More specifically, the case facts used in the model of death penalty decisions combined facts previously discovered to be significantly related to state death penalty decisions 4Since there were more than 10 times as many death penalty decisions than gender discrimination decisions in most years, it was not feasible to code all the death penalty decisions.
5However, the addition of case facts does not appear to substantively affect conclusions about the effect of religion on judicial votes. When a model containing only the common core variables (without case facts) was run, the direction and level of significance was the same in all three issue areas as in the more fully specified models presented below. The dependent variable for each of the models is the direction of each judge's vote. A liberal vote was coded 1 and a conservative vote was coded 0. A liberal vote was defined as one striking down the death penalty or overturning a sentence of death in a death penalty case; or that narrows the gender gap in a gender discrimination case; or that supports greater protection for asserted First Amendment claims, or is less restrictive of material that is alleged to be obscene in obscenity cases. Building on previous integrated models of judicial decision making, the models below also contain common indicators of judicial attitudes, changing Supreme Court policy, and a measure of the context of judicial decision making. In addition, each model contains a series of variables to capture the effects of the case facts hypothesized to be most relevant for each given policy area. A summary list of all the variables used in the models is provided in table 1.
Independent Variables Common to Models in All Three
Unfortunately, direct, independent measures of the ideology of the hundreds of judges who have served on the 52 state supreme courts since 1970 do not exist; nor is it feasible to obtain them. Therefore, the best that can be done is to select an indicator that will serve as an inferential measure of judicial ideology. The best indicator that is readily available for most state supreme court judges is political party affiliation. A wide variety of studies suggests that party identification provides a rough indicator of the ideology of appellate court judges and that Democratic judges (coded 1) are generally more liberal than Republican judges (coded 0) in most issue areas of civil liberties and economic regulation (Goldman 1975 6This classification is taken from Kellstedt and Green 1993. Judges whose religion could not be ascertained or whose religious affiliation did not fit one of these four categories (e.g., Russian Orthodox) were excluded from analysis. The total number of cases excluded from analysis because of missing data (primarily missing data on the religion or political party of the judge) was 1,518 votes for death penalty cases, 961 for obscenity cases, and 313 for gender discrimination cases. 
Case Facts Used as Controls for Each Model
Most integrated models of judicial decision making have derived the case facts included in their analyses from among the readily identifiable facts that ju-9 While we believe that the measure of citizen ideology is superior to all commonly used measures of region, we reran the models below twice, once using a simple North-South regional dichotomy and once with a four-way classification of region. Use of these measures of region in place of citizen ideology did not substantially reduce the effects of religion reported below. dicial doctrine has identified as relevant to the resolution of the conflict before the court. Both the advocates of the importance of the legal model for judicial decision making and those who maintain the primacy of judicial attitudes are in agreement that a properly specified model of judicial decision making must identify the set of case facts that are most relevant to judicial decisions in a given case category. The case facts employed in each model below are primarily viewed as control variables to insure that any associations discovered between religion and judicial decisions are not an artifact of some correlation between particular types of cases and the concentration of particular religions in regions giving rise to those types of cases.
The model of death penalty decisions includes three victim characteristics that Hall and Brace (1 994a, 1994b) found to be associated with support for the death penalty. Thus, it is expected that conservative votes will be more likely if the victim was female, elderly, or a police officer. In addition, the model below tests their expectations that conservative decisions are more likely if the murder occurred in conjunction with a rape or a robbery or if multiple murders were committed. George and Epstein's (1992) analysis of death penalty decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that liberal decisions are more likely if the defendant was charged with some crime other than intentional murder or if the defendant argued that the death penalty should be overturned because the jury was death qualified.10
The model of gender discrimination decisions includes several variables derived from Supreme Court precedent. First, liberal decisions are expected to be more likely when the challenged statute discriminates on its face or the law is a civil rather than a criminal regulation. Second, equal protection doctrine recognizes that if males and females are not similarly situated in regard to the activity at issue, then different treatment does not violate equal protection. Therefore, a statute defended on the grounds that there are "real differences" between the sexes should have a better chance of being upheld than one not based on such substantial differences. Similarly, the claim that the differential treatment is "benign" may also increase the chances that the challenged action will be upheld. Therefore, the presence of either of these two defenses should decrease the chance of a liberal vote. In addition, equal protection claims often turn on the level of scrutiny employed by the courts. Therefore, the higher the level of scrutiny that the government concedes should be employed, the more likely a liberal vote.11
The model of obscenity decisions includes three indicators of the type of material alleged to be obscene: whether the material was primarily written text, a film, or from a magazine. Dummy variables were created for each of these tvnes of material, taking the value 1 if the material alleged to be obscene was of that type and coded 0 otherwise. The excluded category was live entertainment that was alleged to be obscene. In addition, courts were expected to grant governments more power to regulate material intended for children. Finally, courts were expected to be more likely to make a liberal decision when the defendants claimed a First Amendment violation and less likely to make a liberal decision when the defendant's primary claim was that scienter was not established. Each of these variables was coded 1 if present and 0 if not present.
Religion and Judges' Votes
The three models of Supreme Court decision making presented below allow the investigation of the effect of judges' religious affiliation on their voting behavior under controls for judicial preferences, changing Supreme Court policy, contextual and institutional variation, and case facts appropriate for each issue area. The findings are presented in tables 2-4. To test each of the directional hypotheses described above, one-tailed tests of statistical significance are reported.
The results for death penalty cases are presented in Table 2 . Judicial preferences appear to be strongly related to the voting choices of the judges. Party identification is arguably only a very rough indicator of differences in the political values of judges. Nevertheless, the coefficient for this variable is robust and statistically significant. That is, in death penalty cases, Democratic judges are substantially more likely than their Republican colleagues to cast liberal votes under controls for variations in changing precedent and contextual pressures. In contrast, the association between prosecutorial experience and judicial votes is negative, indicating that former prosecutors are significantly more likely than other judges to vote to uphold the death penalty. These findings strongly reinforce the conclusions of other studies that have found that the political values of appellate court judges are important influences on judicial decisions.
Influences from the legal subculture also appear to have important effects on judicial votes. The decisions of state court judges become significantly more conservative as the Supreme Court shifted steadily to the right during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. While the control variable used to capture changing Supreme Court policy provides only a rough indicator of changing precedent, the results are consistent with the expectation that judges are responsive to some influences from the legal subculture. Together with the findings on the influence of the political preferences of judges, these results provide strong confirmation for the assertion of Richardson and Vines (1970) and others that judicial votes can best be understood as a resultant of the sometimes conflicting pressures from the legal and democratic subcultures.
While it is increasingly common for studies of appellate court decision making to examine the effects of both judicial attitudes and legal influences, contextual effects have been less frequently examined. The analysis presented in table 2 suggests that these oversights may be unfortunate. The association between the citizen ideology of each state and the pattern of judicial decisions is strong and statistically significant. Judges from conservative states were substantially more likely to cast conservative votes than their brethren immersed in more liberal cultures.
Overall, the results of the analysis in Table 2 demonstrate the utility of integrated models of judicial decision making. The results for obscenity and gender discrimination cases reported in Table 2 are similar. They suggest that no singlefactor explanations of judicial behavior (e.g., mechanical jurisprudence or the Attitudinal Model) are satisfactory accounts of voting on state supreme courts. Instead, judicial decisions appear to be the result of the interactions among a complex set of forces including judicial values, legal forces, and contextual pressures. As predicted from earlier studies, Democratic judges are substantially more liberal than their Republican colleagues, and former prosecutors are more conservative. But judicial attitudes are not the whole story; the decisional trends of state court judges were also highly responsive to the changing trends on the Supreme Court.
Turning to the main focus of this analysis, the effect of judges' religious affiliations is also evident in the model of death penalty decisions. As can be seen from table 2, evangelical judges were significantly more likely to vote to uphold the death penalty than were either mainline Protestants or Jewish judges, and they were marginally more supportive of the death penalty than were Catholics. These findings are analogous to the findings from studies of the mass public that have found that evangelicals tend to support a strong "law and order" orientation.
Within the context of this integrated model of judicial decision making, the religious affiliation of the judges appears to exert a substantial influence. As hypothesized, evangelical judges were substantially more likely to cast conservative votes than their mainline Protestant brethren even after the effects of party, prosecutorial experience, state citizen ideology, and changing Supreme Court policy were accounted for. Catholic judges were also more likely than mainline Protestants to support conservative outcomes, but they were less conservative than the Protestant evangelicals. Jewish judges had voting patterns that were similar to those of mainline Protestants.
The effects of religion in the obscenity decisions of the courts were similar to those discovered in death penalty cases. Obscenity cases often involve choices that most directly involve moral judgments that impinge on religous beliefs. Evangelicals in a wide variety of settings tend to support traditional values that are hostile to toleration of even soft-core pornography. Therefore, the results in Table 2 are consistent with expectations derived from the general social and moral orientations of different religious groups. Evangelical judges were significantly more likely to vote to support conservative outcomes in obscenity cases than their mainline Protestant brethren. In obscenity as in the death penalty cases, Catholic judges also were significantly more conservative than mainline Protestants and in fact appear to be almost as conservative as the evangelical judges.
The effects of religion are most clearly defined in gender discrimination cases. Catholic judges and Jewish judges appear to be slightly more liberal than mainline Protestant judges, but the differences fall short of the .05 level of statistical significance. On the other hand, evangelical judges stand out as substantially more likely to support conservative decisions than judges of any of the other three religious groups. These results are consistent with studies of mass political behavior that have found adherents of the new Religious Right to oppose abortion and the ERA and to favor the maintenance of traditional gender distinctions. The coefficients presented in Table 2 indicate that these differences are statistically significant in spite of the relatively small sample size for gender discrimination cases. The data in Table 2 also indicate that the difference in the probability of liberal votes being cast by evangelicals compared to judges of other religions is greater than the difference between Democrats and Republicans.
In all three issue areas, the coefficients for a number of the case facts included in the models appear to suggest that the state courts are responsive to Supreme Court precedent. For example, precedent creates a strong presumption that sale of sexually explicit materials to minors is more subject to government regulation than sale of similar material to adults. Thus, if courts are responsive to precedent, prosecutions for sales to minors should carry a higher probability of being upheld than sales to adults (i.e., conservative decisions will be more likely when the sales are to minors). The strong negative coefficient for the variable that captured whether the action targeted children or adults is consistent with this predicted effect of precedent. More importantly, the addition of controls for the most relevant case facts in each of the three issue areas examined have virtually no effect on the strength of the relationship between judges' religious affiliation and their tendency to support the liberal position. Even under controls for these case facts, evangelical judges in all three issue areas tended to support the conservative position to a significantly greater extent than their mainline Protestant and Jewish brethren (and in gender discrimination cases they were also substantially more likely than Catholic judges to support the conservative position). While the MLE coefficients in Table 2 can be used to indicate the directionality and (along with the standard error) statistical significance of the effect of each independent variable, the magnitude of the coefficient is not readily interpretable. Therefore, we present in Table 3 an illustration of the difference that judges' religion can make in the probability of a liberal vote for judges of each party in each of the three issue areas. The estimated probabilities derived from the MLE coefficients in Table 2 assume that the values of all variables except those for party and religion are set at their mean values. The data show that when political party is controlled, the effect of changing from a mainline Protestant to an evangelical judge decreases the probability of a liberal vote from 8 to 13 percentage points, depending on the issue area. While the magnitude of this impact is moderate, it should be noted that it is essentially the same as the effect of changing the party of the judge while holding the religion constant.
Conclusions
Our analysis of the decisions of state supreme court justices who are evangelicals provides evidence to support the claim that judges' religion has an influence on those votes in the areas of gender discrimination, obscenity, and the death penalty. The relationship discovered between the religion and votes of state supreme court judges is most likely a reflection of the connection between judges' religious affiliation and their attitudes. 12 This is a significant finding in that we see that including religion in the group of characteristics commonly used by judicial scholars to explain judicial votes uncovers effects that have been previously missed. Controlling for party identification, prosecutor status, Supreme Court policy, citizen ideology and institutional characteristics of the state, and the relevant case facts does not negate the impact of religion. Religious denomination has an independent and notable effect on judicial decision making even when these control variables have notable effects of their own. This suggests that religious affiliation represents a set of influences on the development of the values ofjudges that are separate from the partisan sources that have been frequently studied.
One implication of these findings is that future studies employing the Attitudinal Model of judicial decision making should not place exclusive reliance on judges' political party as the sole surrogate for their values. Instead, a combination of political party and religious affiliation may provide a better indicator of the values of state court judges.
The effect of religion on the votes of evangelical justices is detectable despite the relatively rough indicator of denominational affiliation that we employ. Other studies delve even deeper into the relationships between issues such as religious salience (Guth and Green 1991), doctrinal beliefs (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993), church involvement and attendance (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993) and political involvement of evangelicals. The indications are that these variables do have effects on evangelical politics, and future research in the area of judicial decision making with regard to religion should attempt to address them.
As a result of these limitations, the present analysis probably underestimates the effects of religion on judges' votes in these cases. The fact that they are, nevertheless, evident in our analysis suggests that the influence religion has on politics in the electorate is present to some degree in the realm of political elites and judicial decision making.
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Final manuscript received 26 May 1998 12The conclusion that attitudes provide the link between religious affiliation and judges' votes is supported by the finding that when only nonunanimous decisions of the courts are examined, the relationship is substantially stronger. Specifically, for nonunanimous decisions, the coefficient for evangelicals in death penalty cases is -.700 (compared to -.324 in all death decisions), and in obscenity cases it is -.848 (compared to -.446 in all obscenity decisions). Only in gender discrimination cases is it lower (-.553 compared to -.689). Since it is widely believed that nonunanimous cases tend to be the kind of cases in which judges are freer to vote their ideological preferences, the strong findings in these cases reinforce the attitudinal interpretation of the effects of religious affiliation.
